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AN ECONOMIC EVALUATION OF ORGANIZED OPTIONS MARKETS
MARK RUBINSTEIN *
1. Introduction
Throughout their history, puts and calls [1] on common stock have been criti-
cized as mere gambling opportunities. Recently, the creation of listed options on
the Chicago Board Options Exchange, the American Stock Exchange and three
regional exchanges in the United States, has given new respectability to options as
investment vehicles. By year-end 1977, listed options to 217 common stocks were
available. Even though the market value of these optioned equities comprised about
sixty percent of the market value of all New York Stock Exchange stocks, even
though the listed options market had been in existence for only four and a half
years, and even though most financial institutions are precluded from certain types
of option investments, for the calendar year 1977 listed options trading volume (in
terms of share equivalents) had grown to seventy-five percent of the common share
volume of the New York Stock Exchange.
This unexpected growth in options trading, a general concern that incentives for
fraudulent investor behavior may be significantly greater in the listed options
market than in the stock market, doubts about the surveillance capability of
options exchanges and brokerage firms, and a fear that options might adversely
affect the price and volume of the underlying stocks or draw "risk capital" away
from unseasoned new equity issues or venture capital, motivated the Securities and
Exchange Commission, in July, 1977, to request a "voluntary" moratorium on the
expansion of the listed options market.
Securities and Exchange Commission Release No. 34-14056, which proposed on
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October 17, 1977 to formalize the listed options market moratorium, stated:
The Commission announced today the initiation of an investigation and study, pursuant to
the Securities Act of 1934, to determine what action is necessary to aid in the enforcement of
the Act, and whether additional rules thereunder should be proposed to protect investors and
the public interest and to maintain fair and orderly markets in connection with the trading of
standardized options and underlying securities.
The release proposed Temporary Rule 9b-l(T), which would make it unlawful for
any national securities exchange by any means
to permit expansion of programs for the trading of standardized options, to alter such pro-
grams in any material respect not expressly approved by order of the Commission, or to permit
the initiation of new programs designed to expand the trading of options.
The phrase "expansion of programs" was interpreted to include, among other
things, the listing of options on new underlying securities and the listing of puts on
existing underlying securities which, thus far, only had listed calls.
At the same time, a number of exchange proposals were pending before the
Commission, including proposals to change strike-price intervals, to multiply exist-
ing expiration cycles, to expand the number of authorized call option classes, to
open the listing of puts on all underlying securities with currently listed calls, to
increase the number of dually listed option classes (i e, the same options traded on
two exchanges), to modify position limits, to initiate trading of options on debt
instruments of the federal government, to list options on underlying securities
traded in the over-the-counter market, to list options on a broad-based stock
market index, and to initiate trading of options at the New York Stock Exchange.
Perhaps the most troublesome issue to be resolved was whether options and their
underlying stock should be traded at the same post. This proposal arises naturally
from the contractual relationship between options and common stock and the con-
sequent parallelism of changes in the price (premium) of options and the price of
the underlying stock. Trading options and stock together would possibly provide
economies of scale and would improve the efficiency of both markets in many
ways. For example, hedged positions such as the simultaneous short sale of stock
and the purchase of calls on that stock would be easier to execute and the reduc-
tion of information trading would reduce transaction costs. Illegal trading practices
could be detected more easily.
The use of options as an investment tool in modem capital markets may yet be
in its infancy. I refer not to the continued expansion of listed puts and calls on
greater numbers of stocks, but to the development of new types of options, such as
options on government bonds and commodity futures. Perhaps the most promising
of recent proposals is the listing of options on a stock market index. Indeed, the
general idea of options on a portfolio of securities (e.g., options on closed-end
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funds specializing in energy stocks), or options on economic indices (e.g., options
on the consumer price index), present interesting possibilities for the future.
This environment of ferment and controversy sets the scene for the following
economic evaluation of organized option markets. In Part 2, 1 provide a general dis-
cussion of the contribution of securities markets to the economy. With this back-
ground, Part 3 examines the role of organized options markets as they now exist and
Part 4 addresses some specific concerns of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion.
2. The economic function of securities markets
A securities market performs three basic economic functions:
(I) Individual wealth allocation. By issuing and purchasing securities, possibly indi-
rectly through financial institutions, individuals (i.e., consuming units) are able
to affect the timing of the consumption of real goods and services over their
lifetimes and are able to pool and redistribute among themselves the risks of
fluctuation in the value of the economy's real assets.
(2) Finn resource allocation. By issuing securities, firms (i.e., producing units) are
able to raise capital from diverse sources. The securities market, by implicitly
charging firms different prices, allocates scarce capital among competing uses.
(3) Source of information. The securities market provides information in the form
of prices, which can be useful for making a variety of important economic deci-
sions.
By borrowing or lending, an individual can choose to postpone or accelerate
the personal consumption of his wealth. By investing in relatively low-risk securi-
ties, such as bonds, an individual can shift the bearing of higher risks to other indi-
viduals. However, since investors are, on balance, risk-averse- they can be induced to
bear greater risk only if their investment promises greater average or expected
return - low return will typically accompany investments of low risk. Thus, the
securities market provides flexibility in matching the risk of investments with the
preferences and opinions of different individuals. Not only are risks redistributed
through the securities market, with greater expected return as the compensation for
bearing the risk, but, to some extent, risk can be pooled through diversification to
achieve reduced risk without sacrificing expected return. This occurs whenever two
investments with the same expected return counter-balance each other: when one
does well and the other does poorly or vice versa. In this case, combining them in
a portfolio leaves the expected return the same but reduces overall risk.
Stock prices that properly reflect available information about corporate pros-
pects play an important role in allocating resources among firms. Higher equity
prices encourage firms to raise equity capital. Perhaps more important, equity
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prices provide early signals to firms of the market's approval or disapproval of their
actions. By this means, the preferences of investors and the aggregate wisdom of the
marketplace are indirectly made available to corporate managers.
It is a basic principle of economics that prices produced in competitive markets
provide participants in the economy with useful information for making a variety
of economic decisions. In particular, an organized and active securities market
brings to bear on security prices the pooled knowledge of all participants in the
market. According to much of the evidence of "efficient markets", this pooled
knowledge contains better predictions of future events than any participant or
small group of participants can consistently discover on its own. Thus, the securities
market performs an extremely useful economic function by making these superior
predictions generally available.
These predictions improve current economic decision-making. For example,
futures prices on commodity exchanges contain an estimate of future spot sprices,
which can guide current decisions to produce or to inventory commodities. Empiri-
cal analysis indicates that the anticipated rate of inflation in the near future can be
deduced from U.S. Treasury Bill discounts. It is well known that recent past
changes in stock market prices tend to be a leading indicator of general economic
activity. Differences in yield to maturity of corporate bonds contain predictions
about the likelihood of future bankruptcy. The so-called yield curve, showing the
relationship at the current time among yields of bonds of differing maturity, can be
used to estimate future spot interest rates. The yield curve itself can be directly
used to determine discount rates in present value calculations for corporate invest-
ment decisions, where alternative projects have cash flows with different time
patterns. One of the key problems of a financial economist is to learn how to
unravel these predictions from security prices.
In general, the greater variety of securities provided by the market, the better
the three functions given above will be performed. At one extreme a decentralized
economy, such as that of the United States, would be seriously impaired if no secu-
rities were available. At the other extreme, we can imagine a securities market pro-
viding so many securities that no additional security could be created whose returns
could not be duplicated by a portfolio of already existing securities. In the jargon of
finance theory, the securities market would then be "complete".
Why are complete markets desirable? I will give two answers, a simple one and
a more complex one. The simple answer is that complete markets are more desir-
able because they provide maximum flexibility for investors. Coincident vith the
ethical basis of western civilization, more choice is usually better than less.
The more complex answer relies on a version of the most important theorem in
economic thought. We say a financial market is Pareto-efficient if no other set of
securities can make some investors better off without making at least one other
investor worse off. In a Pareto-efficient financial market, no change in the market
would be unanimously approved by investors. The version of the theorem we will
need says: a complete market is always Pareto-efficient irrespective of the nature of
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investors, while an incomplete market must be Pareto-inefficient in some circum-
stances.
Nonetheless, an incomplete market may be Pareto-efficient. For example, con-
sider the extreme case where all investors are economically identical, i.e., they have
the same endowed (initial) resources, preferences, and expectations. In this case, no
trading will occur, since identical investors must hold identical positions. Prices on
whatever securities that exist are set at such levels that each investor is content with
his own resources. The fact that no trading is desired implies that the financial market
is Pareto-efficient and therefore no securities need exist. However, if investors were
economically different, some trading would generally be desired. For example,
investors very averse to risk may desire to exchange their initial highly uncertain
pattern of returns for a relatively riskless pattern. In this case, a seriously incom-
plete market would probably be Pareto-inefficient. The unique feature of a com-
plete market is its property of Pareto-efficiency irrespective of the economic identi-
ties of investors.
Unfortunately, a number of practical matters prohibit the creation of our
idealized complete market. Chief among these are the difficulty of writing specific
and enforceable contracts to cover certain contingencies (such as options on future
labor income), the costs of exchanging securities (i.e., transactions costs), and
government regulation.
In view of the practical impossibility of creating complete markets, we need to
ask two questions:
(1) Given the traditional securities issued by firms, what other securities can be
created which will move the financial market toward completeness without
excessive transactions costs?
(2) Are investors sufficiently similar that maximum welfare can be approximated
closely with only a few securities in addition to the basic set of securities issued
by firms? If so, which securities are they?
These questions are central to the formation of efficiently functioning securities
exchanges and financial intermediaries. The next part provides some answers to
demonstrate the efficacy of options.
3. The role of options
Gambling usually refers to the purchase of a future monetary reward which may
(1) be unproductive from a social point of view,
(2) have a negative expected value,
(3) be highly uncertain,
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(4) have a short time before payoff, or
(5) arise from uninformed differences of opinion among several participants who
bet against each other.
All five characteristics typify horse race betting. If options did not reduce the cost
of diversification, could not affect corporate productive decisions, or did not lead
to wider dissemination of useful information, they would probably be socially
harmful, since they would tempt poorly informed individuals to unbalance their
portfolio -holdings away from prudent diversification and would generate unneces-
sary transactions costs. That is, from a social standpoint, the options market would
be, at best, a zero-sum game, where the gain to society from its existence would
be zero or negative. Since options must compete with other opportunities, options
would have all the characteristics of gambles except (2) and none of the features of
useful investments.
It is easy to dismiss options as mere gambling opportunities; it is harder to
demonstrate that options perform a useful social function. I will now advance this
more difficult and more interesting argument. First, I will consider options as an aid
to individual wealth allocation; second, to firm resource allocation; and third, as a
source of information.
Even cursory examination must lead to the conclusion that currently listed
options considerably expand the range of investment opportunities in the securities
market. For example, without options it may be impractical, through the use of
other securities, to take a position which benefits fully from stock price increases
but which is insured against the loss resulting from a decline. To accomplish this
with options, one need only buy a put on a stock which would otherwise have been
held by itself. To take another example, suppose you, as a potential investor,
believe some important news is about to be made public (such as the results of a
merger negotiation), which would have a significant impact on the market price of a
stock, but you do not know in advance whether the news will be favorable or un-
favorable. Simultaneously buying a put and a call on the same underlying stock
might be an appropriate strategy. In this case you show a profit if the stock price
makes a strong move - and it does not matter in which direction! If the price
change is minor, you lose only the cost of the options, but without options you
could not have safely taken advantage of your beliefs. This is a clear example,
among many others, of the situation in which the availability of options adds flexi-
bility to investment decisions.
Except where the ratio of the market price of a stock to the striking price of an
option on that stock is very high, the change in the option price in response to
a change in the price of the underlying stock is less than the stock price change. The
ratio of the change in the option price to the change in the price of the under-
lying stock is known as the hedge ratio, A, and it represents the number of shares an
investor must hold for each option sold in order to have a portfolio that is riskless
for small price changes. Suppose the hedge ratio is 0.5. In this case if the price
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of the underlying stock changes by J, the option price will change by 1. If, for
each share held, an investor sold two options, a - point price increase (decrease) in
the stock would exactly offset the -8 point decrease (increase) on the two options
the investor was short.
Since a short position of one call plus a long position of A shares of the under-
lying stock is the equivalent of a risk free portfolio for relatively small changes in
the price of the stock, it is the equivalent of an investment in government (default
free) bonds. It follows that the reverse, i.e., a long position of one call plus a short
position of A shares of the underlying stock is the equivalent of a short position in
government bonds. A long position in one call is therefore equivalent to the
short position in government bonds plus a long position of A shares. But that, in
turn, is similar to a margined holding of stock. With the passage of time, all other
things being equal, the values of options decline. To maintain an equivalent mar-
gined position, the investor would have to adjust his equivalent portfolio of
stock and bonds so that the percentage margin would change. The call permits an
automatic adjustment of the percentage margin with the passage of time [21, with-
out incurring transaction costs. Furthermore, it is possible to use options in con-
junction with stock to create a position which automatically changes in risk as the
value of the stock changes. Consider a portfolio that is long in puts and the under-
lying stock. This is obviously a hedge position since it is protected against a fall in
the price of the stock below the striking price. A portfolio of equivalent risk can be
created by taking an appropriate long position in both the stock and a default-free
bond. Note that if the stock price falls, both the stock/bond portfolio and the
stock/put portfolio automatically become more conservative. However, once the
stock price falls to the striking price, all the downside risk of the stock/put port-
folio disappears. To achieve a comparable reduction in the risk of the stock/bond
portfolio, the investor would have to sell all the stock and incur the associated
transaction costs. Not only can these costs be avoided with the stock/put portfolio,
but the investor retains the opportunity to recoup his losses until the put expires.
It can also be demonstrated that there are conditions under which options can
be used along with or in place of stock to achieve more efficient portfolio diversifi-
cation.
Under some circumstances, though fewer since the Tax Reform Act of 1976, the
use of options may reduce taxes. This, of course, may represent a private but not
social benefit.
Given existing margin requirements, calls provide a means of taking positions
similar to buying stock, but with less capital. Since a purchased call is indeed equiv-
alent (but without the transactions costs) to a carefully adjusted portfolio of the
purchased underlying stock and default-free borrowing, option transactions may
allow investors to lever at interest rates better than they face directly.
Similarly, buying a put is an alternative to shorting stock. Since the proceeds of
a short sale must be left with the lender of the stock and margin rules treat short
sales as though they were purchases, the cash outlay associated with buying a put is
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much less than with a short sale. Given existing commission schedules for short term
positions (i.e., less than one and a half years), options may also provide a cheaper
way to short the underlying stock [3].
Accompanying this practical view of options is a more abstract and fundamental
interpretation from the academic litereature. To make this intelligible, I will first
need to introduce some terminology. A pattern of returns is defined as a set of
identifiable portfolio outcomes, exhausting all possible future contingencies. For
example,, "$ 50 if the Dow Jones Industrial Average is less than 1,000 at the end of
the year and $ 150 if it is equal to or greater than 1,000" is a pattern of returns.
More generally, a pattern of returns may be associated with multiple and more com-
plex contingencies, provided only that they exhaust all possibilities. "The returns
on General Motors stock" defines a pattern of returns. The ability to form port-
folios of different securities vastly multiplies the variety of patterns of returns con-
structable in the marketplace. The set of all possible patterns of returns construct-
able by forming portfolios of an existing set of securities is said to be the space
spanned by those securities.
It seems natural to ask how ordinary puts and calls contribute to the patterns of
returns constructable from their underlying stocks. Stephen Ross, Professor of Eco-
nomics and Finance at Yale University, has provided an excellent analysis of this
question [4]. His principle result, for our purposes, compares the ability of ordi-
nary options to enrich the patterns of returns available to investors with the pat-
terns of returns obtainable from "simple options". A simple option is a generalized
form of option whose return is solely determined by the return of a single under-
lying stock. Ordinary puts and calls are just one example of simple options.
Another example would be an option which paid the square of the value of the
stock on an agreed date. That is, if the stock price on that date were $ 50, the
option would be worth $ 2,500, and if its price were $ 100, the option would be
worth $ 10,000. With little imagination we can think of many exotic kinds of
simple options. In fact, the variety of simple options constructable from just one
underlying stock is infinite.
Despite this, we have Ross' surprising proposition: for a given set of underlying
stocks, ordinary puts and calls span the same space as all simple options. That is,
nothing is lost in terms of investor opportunities to form patterns of returns, if only
ordinary puts and calls are available but other simple options are not. Despite its
abstraction, Ross' proposition may help explain the popularity of puts and calls.
I now turn to the second basic function of security markets, as an aid to
resource allocation by firms. I have already argued that stock prices that properly
reflect available information about corporate prospects assist the efficient alloca-
tion of real resources. Puts and calls, through a type of arbitrage with underlying
stocks, increase the number and diversity of preferences and expectations that
come to bear on equity prices. For example, if the prices of calls were to become
too high, relative to the underlying stock, arbitrageurs could sell calls against a long
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position in the stock. By this means, the stock price would rise, and the preferences
and expectations of option investors would be reflected in the price. Options thus
serve to increase the efficiency and liquidity of the stock market.
Finally, one can ask how options contribute to the third basic function of
security markets, as a source of information. Like other securities the prices of
options also contain implicit predicitions about future events. For a given striking
price and expiration date, and the current price and cash dividends of its underlying
stock, the principal determinant of the value of an option is the anticipated volatil-
ity of its underlying stock return. Other things being equal, the greater the anti-
cipated volatility, the more valuable the option. In an "efficient market", one can
justifiably infer increased uncertainty surrounding the prospects of a firm if the
premiums of its listed options increase [5]. The conventional method of estimating
anticipated volatility is to extrapolate from observed past stock price volatility. By
this reckoning, stocks which have been highly volatile in the recent past are to
remain highly volatile in the future. This naive extrapolation fails to consider a
myriad of events which can alter this pattern, such as capital structure changes,
mergers, or increased stability of sales. In contrast, in a well-functioning market, the
relevant up-to-date information relating to stock volatility will be brought to bear
on, and can be inferred from the prices of options.
4. Special concerns of the Securities and Exchange Commission
Other than the gambling arguments considered above, the most common objec-
tion to option trading is that it might adversely influence the price and volume of
the underlying stocks. In particular, trading activity might be diverted from under-
lying stocks to their associated options, and the resulting decreased liquidity might
increase stock price volatility and dealer bid-ask spreads. Another hypothesis con-
tends that the options market draws speculative capital away from the new issues
market and low priced stocks. Finally, abnormal stock price behavior might be ob-
served near expiration dates. These have been perennial concerns of the SEC.
In response, the Chicago Board Options Exchange completed its own internal
studies and commissioned Robert R. Nathan Associates and more recently, Manage-
ment Analysis Center, to investigate these issues by statistical procedures [6]. Both
groups have concluded that the new listed options market has had little effect on
other capital markets. A summary of the 1974 Nathan Report states:
The Chicago Board Options Exchange has been a useful and promising addition to the capital
markets. Our study has not found any evidence that the CBOE has had an adverse effect on the
markets for underlying stocks or on the markets for low-priced stocks or new issues. Rather,
during a period of great uncertainty in the capital markets generally, the CBOE has attracted
a number of investors to return to equity-type risks through the risk redistribution, risk limita-
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tion, and various hedging strategies it makes possible. We believe this has helped improve the
efficiency and fairness of the stock market itself.
However, until these findings have been confirmed by investigators wholly indepen-
dent of exchange support, they cannot be viewed as definitive [7].
Beyond these statistical findings, there are sound economic reasons for presum-
ing that options trading does not divert capital from the equity markets. Proponents
of the equity shortage point of view overlook a basic economic concept. In con-
trast to stocks, corporate bonds, and warrants, securities such as puts and calls,
whose values depend on an underlying security, tend not to divert capital away
from investment in real resources. Puts and calls are issued by individuals and finan-
cial intermediaries, not by nonfinancial corporations. On the aggregate national
balance sheet, stocks, corporate bonds, and warrants appear as offsetting items to
real assets. However, as in the case of all forms of debt between individuals and/or
financial intermediaries, options do not appear. The liabilities of option writers are
cancelled by the claims of buyers so that the net investment in options is zero. Puts
and calls are primarily a means of redistributing risk. A proponent of the equity
shortage point of view must then answer the following question: since the funds
used to purchase options are reinvested by the writers, what do they buy if not
equities?
This counter-argument can be strengthened even further. Trading in puts and
calls brings a greater number and variety of opinions to bear on the prices of equi-
ties. The additional information about volatility provided by options could con-
vince some investors that the equity market involves greater risk than they other-
wise believed, and others that it involves less risk. Whatever the net result, these
potential influences on the equity market are socially beneficial. After all, prices in
the stock market can be too high as well as too low.
A second general area of SEC concern has been the adequacy of surveillance of
option trading at the exchange level. In particular, in its release No. 34-14056, the
Commission cited the following specific concerns:
(1) adequacy of exchange audit trails [8],
(2) fictitious trades to influence market maker margins,
(3) market maker wash sales for tax purposes,
(4) proprietary trading to attract order flow,
(5) intermarket price manipulation, and
(6) front-running of block trades.
For each of these, I will examine the procedures used by the CBOE.
(1) Adequacy of exchange audit trails
The primary surveillance tool of the CBOE is its Market Data Report (MDR), a
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computer-readable, time-stamped record of every transaction and bid-ask quote on
its exchange floor. For example, the MDR might contain the following two com-
puter records [9]:
01105/77 12:13:01 PRDJUL40C 3i 32 374
01/05/77 12:13:41 PRDJUL40C 5 3' 371 RAPSIG
The first record says that on January 5, 1977, at twelve thirteen and one second
Central Time, a bid-ask quote of 31-32 occurred for PRD/JUL/40 calls and at that
time the last stock transaction price was 374. From the second record we learn that
on the same date, forty seconds later, 5 PRD/JUL/40 calls traded at 31, for which
the seller was RAP and the buyer SIG, and at that time, the last stock transaction
price was 375'. The exchange confirms the transaction information by subsequently
compiling a Matched Trade Listing (MTL) from information on matched trades
received from clearing members. These trades are then reported by the exchange to
the Options Clearing Corporation. These two independently constructed versions of
transactions on the floor are compared by computer, which produces the daily
MDR-MTL Comparison Report. All market maker stock transactions cleared
through OCC clearing members are also reported to the CBOE.
In contrast, while the New York Stock Exchange generates a computer-readable
listing of stock transactions as they occur on the floor, this listing does not include
the identification symbols of the floor traders [10]. Moreover, their record of
cleared stock trades does not include about one-quarter of the transactions. The
omitted trades are those for which both sides are cleared by the same brokerage
house because it represented both the buyer and the seller, or those cleared through
a regional exchange. It would appear that the CBOE audit trail is superior to the
audit trail at the NYSE, despite the more complex organization of the options
market (eg., many differelit options on the same underlying stock and the com-
petitive market maker system).
(2) Fictitious trades to influence market maker margins
Market maker margins have been marked according to the final ask prices for the
day. If the market makers as a group tend to be on one side of the market in an
option series, there may be an incentive to insert a closing ask quote considerably
above or below the last trade. This may force the trade of a token single contract at
a high price, if they tend to be buyers, or at a low price if they tend to be writers.
Although it is unusual for the market makers to be on one side of the market, to
meet this potential problem the CBOE has changed its marking system to use the
last transaction if it lies between the closing bid and ask, and the closing ask if the
last transaction lies below the bid and ask. Using its daily MDR, the CBOE also
routinely checks the end of day market maker trades.
(3) Market maker wash sales for tax purposes
Market makers may engage in prearranged trades, which result in reported trades
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on the tape, which are agreed to be reversed after the tax year. To identify this
illegal behavior, on a daily, weekly, monthly, and quarterly basis, the CBOE creates
computer-generated reports, constructed from the daily MTL, grouping all the
trades by each market maker together. Special attention is paid to market maker-to-
market maker trades and to trades executed by a floor broker on behalf of a market
maker. These reports allow the exchange to detect reversals at the same price and
volume, revesals at the same volume with a price differential, and other unusual
trading patterns. Other reports with different formats are also used to enforce the
rule requiring a market maker to complete at least fifty percent of his trades in his
principal assignment and to detect violation of position limits almost immediately
after they occur. The exchange has several employees whose principal task is to pro-
vide a continuous monitoring of market maker transactions utilizing these reports.
(4) Propietary trading to attract order flow
The advent of dually listed options has created intensive competition among
option exchanges. For each underlying stock, brokerage firms typically designate a
single exchange as the "primary market". Unless a broker specificaliy indicates
otherwise, the house's computer system automatically routes all orders in an under-
lying stock to the designated exchange. For example, although at one time both the
Chicago Board Options Exchange and the Pacific Stock Exchange listed Bank America
options, Merrill Lynch sent virtually all of its BankAmerica orders to the CBOE,
since that was the designated primary market [11]. No attempt was made to check
whether a better execution was possible on another exchange. Moreover, other
brokerage firms tend to follow Merrill's lead. To earn designation as the primary
market, the exchange usually selected is the one providing the greatest liquidity,
often imperfectly measured by volume. Under these circumstances, members of an
exchange have a strong incentive to trade solely for the purpose of creating the
appearance of liquidity.
When the CBOE became aware of this behavior, it took several steps to end it,
including improved surveillance of market maker transactions, and published
volume data separating public from proprietary trades.
(5) Intermarket price manipulation
It is frequently suggested that exchange members, with substantial short option
positions, manipulate the price of the underlying security near the expiration date
to prevent profitable exercise. This procedure is known as "capping". However,
attempted capping is fraught with risk, and success is probably rare if not impos-
sible, particularly in very active stocks. Nonetheless, the exchange makes a daily
check on market makers with both substantial option positions and transactions in
the underlying stocks.
(6) Front-running of block trades
"Front running" occurs when a firm or individual, knowing in advance that a
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large block of stock is about to be traded, buys or sells options to profit from this
information. When the CBOE first became aware of this practice, it filed a pro-
posed new rule with the SEC, which would prevent exchange members from exe-
cuting proprietary orders in options when they possess nonpublic information con-
cerning an agreed block transaction (i.e., 10,000 shares or more) in underlying
securities. This prohibition would also apply to an exchange member who passes on
nonpublic information concerning block transactions to a customer, who then
trades on the basis of the information. The CBOE audit trail provides the capability
for enforcement.
A similar strategy, "tape racing", occurs when a firm or individual knows of a
price change in an underlying stock before it prints on the tape. To a great extent,
this problem was eliminated when, at the request of the CBOE, the NYSE installed
a high-speed tape.
The surveillance procedures of the CBOE are considerably more extensive than
this brief survey can cover. Indeed, some aspects of these procedures are, for
obvious reasons, confidential. Of course, all violations of Options Clearing Corpora-
tion and exchange rules cannot be completely eliminated or detected, and the rules
themselves can no doubt be improved. Nonetheless, if judged by comparison with
the current practice across the entire organized market for securities in the United
States, it appears that the exchange has developed very sophisticated procedures for
dealing with these problems and has been very sensitive to the peculiar aspects of
option trading.
A final area of SEC concern involved the brokerage industry. In its release, the
Commission claimed it was aware of broker conduct in selling listed options involv-
ing communication of deceptive sales literature, churning of customer accounts,
and recommendation of transactions unsuited to customers' financial means and
investment objectives.
To reduce deceptive sales practices, each exchange member firm doing option
business with public customers must appoint a registered options principal, who
must be an officer or partner in the firm and qualify by passing a written examina-
tion on options. Before a registered representative (i.e., a broker) of the firm can
trade listed options for public customers, he must also pass an examination. More-
over, for each public customer, the registered representative must receive specific
approval for listed options trading from his firm's registered options principal, and
written approval by the firm's registered options principal is required for each dis-
cretionary [12] option order. Each public customer must submit a written agree-
ment, acknowledging that his account will be handled in accordance with the rules
of the Options Clearing Corporation and the options exchanges. In particular, he
must agree not to violate the position and exercise limits.
Before commencement of trading, the registered representative is required to
deliver the prospectus of the Option Clearing Corporation to his customer, and the
prospectus must accompany any distribution of option sales literature, market
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letters, research reports, or exchange educational materials. Moreover, all distri-
buted information generated by the firm must first be approved by the firm's
registered options principal and then by the options exchanges.
Unfortunately, none of these precautions can assure that the customer will read
the prospectus, let alone understand the risk-return implications of option trading.
Even after more than six years since the opening of the CBOE and extensive
exchange efforts to educate the public, options remain an arcane and complex sub-
ject to most investors. The high commissions per dollar invested, the ability to
generate more transactions through covered positions which conserve margin, and
the forced turnover due to the relatively short maturities of options can lead,
without careful management, to excessive transactions costs and little hope of
profit commensurate with the risk borne. These conditions, together with the high
risk potential of indiscriminately selected option positions, can make investments
in options dangerous for uninformed investors.
Because of the potential for options to generate high commissions, an unin-
formed investor becomes particularly vulnerable if he permits his broker to trade
his account on a discretionary basis. To be sure, the customer is sent a record of
every transaction, but this information is often incomplete or difficult to sum-
marize. Brokerage firms are charged with policing the suitability of options trans-
actions, particularly for discretionary accounts. Nonetheless, there have been
several instances of intentional churning of discretionary option accounts which,
for various reasons, have been permitted to continue for two or three years before
reaching the customer's attention.
As these improper brokerage practices meet with judicial remedy, new standards
will be needed to gauge excessive turnover in option-oriented accounts. For equity
accounts, a turnover rate of more than six times per year has been regarded as
prima facie evidence of churning [13]. From an economist's point of view, this
standard is unfortunate. Since different types of securities, or even the same securi-
ties traded under different conditions, have different commission rates, turnover
does not adequately reflect the level of commissions in the "account. It would be
better if the courts focused on the ratio of annual commissions to the average
market value of the account during the year. This measure indicates the rate of
return required in the account simply to break even (i.e., cover commissions). With
a one percent one-way commission rate on stock, an annual turnover of six times
is equivalent to a twelve percent annual commission cost-to-value ratio. Since
option commissions per invested dollar are about two and a half times stock com-
missions, the turnover standard for an option-oriented account should be lower
than for a pure equity account. For example, if equity and option transacted
dollars are split two-thirds and one-third respectively, then an annual turnover of
only about three and one-third times would be needed to produce a twelve percent
annual commission cost-to-value ratio. In this case, to be consistent with treatment
of equity accounts, a turnover of three and one-third times per year would be prima
facie evidence of churning.
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5. Conclusion
In an era of unprecedented development of organized option markets, we have
seen that there are sound economic reasons for the increasing popularity of options.
Options considerably enrich the menu of available investment opportunities, they
should increase the allocative efficiency of the securities market both for the indi-
viduals and firms, and they provide valuable predictions of certain aspects of future
economic activity. Moreover, in many cases they accomplish this with less capital
required and lower transaction costs than comparable positions in common stock.
The arguments that option trading adversely influences the price and volume of
underlying stocks, or that the options market draws speculative capital away from
the new issues or venture capital markets, are economically weak and empirically
unsupported. Compared with other sectors of the securities market, the self-regu-
latory rules and procedures of the Chicago Board Options Exchange appear to be
quite sophisticated and sensitive to the peculiar aspects of option trading.
The single weak strand in this fiber is the failure of some brokerage firms to
provide adequate protection for their customers, particularly those with discre-
tionary accounts.
Notes
[1] A call is an option to buy a fixed number of shares of a specified common stock at a
fixed price at any time until a fixed date. A put is similar except that it is an option to sell
shares. The fixed price is termed the striking price and the fixed date, the expiration date.
121 This interpretation of an option first appeared in the already classic article on option
pricing, Black and Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 Journal of
Political Economy 637 (1973).
[3] For an analytical comparison of stock and option margin requirements and trans-
actions costs see Rubinstein and Cox, Options Markets, chap. 3 (Prentice-Hall, forthcoming
1980).
[4] Ross, Options and Efficiency, 90 Quarterly Journal of Economics 75 (1976).
[5] Among option investors, one often hears that it is a good time to buy options because
option prices are low relative to the past. A believer in "efficient markets" would, instead, infer
that volatilities on typical optioned stock are low relative to the past. He would therefore not
conclude that options are underpriced. His conclusion would be strengthened if interest rates
had remained unchanged.
[6] See Robert R. Nathan Associates, Inc., Review of Initial Trading Experience at the
Chicago Board Options Exchange (December, 1974); Management Analysis Center, The Impact
of Exchange-Traded Options on the Market for New Issues of Common Stock of Small Com-
panies (June, 1977).
[7] The SEC itself conducted a study of these matters but did not release its findings for
public scrutiny. However, reports in the press indicate the study more or less confirms the
CBOE supported studies.
[81 An audit trail is the information in available records for reconstructing a transaction
from its inception to its completion. A complete audit trail makes it possible to identify all
parties to, and the timing of the steps in, a transaction.
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[9] For ease in reading, the information in each record has been somewhat reorganized.
Transaction pref'tres indicating that a record is out of sequence, part of a spread order, etc. may
also appear on each record.
[10] The NYSE record also only time-stamps the trade to the minute.
[11] Subsequently, the PSE has found it economically advisable to delist its BankAmerica
options.
[12] In a discretionary account, the registered representative can place orders without prior
approval of his customer. However, the customer is required to provide prior written authoriza-
tion for any discretionary power he delegates.
[13] Wolfson, Phillips and Rusio, Regulation of Brokers, Dealers and Securities Markets,
see. 2.11 (1977). Turnover is the dollar value of purchases during a period divided by tile
average net market value (i.e., net equity) of an account. This measure would be improved, par-
ticularly for option-oriented accounts, if purchases were replaced with half of purchases plus
sales.
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